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Economic Costs of Inequality
Richard H. McAdams t
Despite its reputation, economics has much to say about the
costs of inequality. Much of the early work in law and economics
avoided the issue of inequality by using a normative metric-
wealth maximization or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency-that gives no
weight to distributional concerns.1 But wealth maximization was
never the dominant normative criteria in the larger discipline of
economics, which is why economists such as Mitchell Polinsky
criticized Richard Posner's wealth maximization theory for
ignoring the distributional analysis of welfare economics. 2 More
recently, Louis Kaplow and Steve Shavell have taken great care
to explain that welfare economics evaluates states of the world
by considering any and all effects the state has on the well-being
of individuals, which obviously includes a consideration
of distribution.3
Economics more famously identifies the benefits of material
inequality. To the extent that inequality is meritocratic-so that
those who contribute more to social welfare receive more
personal income and wealth-unequal material rewards will en-
courage greater effort and risk-taking, including greater invest-
ment in human capital. Obviously, an issue of great dispute is
exactly how meritocratic our material inequality is-a particu-
larly salient issue in a recession focusing attention on executive
t Walter J. Blum Professor and Kearney Director of the Program in Law and
Economics, The University of Chicago Law School. I thank participants at workshops and
seminars at the University of Chicago, Harvard, Berkeley, and Stanford for comments.
1 See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J Legal
Stud 103 (1979); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency
Norms in Common Law Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L Rev 487 (1980).
2 See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A
Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 Harv L Rev 1655, 1679-80
(1974). Indeed, Posner has since made some concessions about the incompleteness of
wealth maximization. See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A
Philosophical Inquiry, in David G. Owen, ed, Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 99-
113 (Oxford 1995).
3 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare 28-38 (Harvard
2002).
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compensation in the financial industry. But given the social
productivity of meritocratic inequality, economics offers a strong
reason to avoid guaranteeing complete material equality. Such a
guarantee would undermine the incentives for work, investment,
and risk-taking that are vital to production.
The question I address, however, is whether economics offers
any instrumental reasons to value material equality. Are there
economic costs of inequality that must be weighed against the
benefits? One can, of course, argue for a social welfare function
that intrinsically values equality. I ask, however, whether ine-
quality imposes instrumental costs that arise even under a utili-
tarian social welfare function, one that gives no weight to distri-
bution. The answer is yes; there are economic costs to inequality.
Some of those costs are outside the scope of this Article. For ex-
ample, increases in inequality tend to dilute the deterrent value
of tort damages, as differences in wealth make it more likely that
the relatively poor will be judgment proof when they injure the
relatively wealthy.4 Surprisingly, some literature suggests that
inequality suppresses growth. 5 But of note for the present Arti-
cle, and for reasons explained below, inequality increases crime.
Even before the present recession, this economic point was a
matter of concern because the long-term trend in the United
States is towards increasing inequality. Census Bureau data
shows a rise in the most common summary measure of income
inequality, the Gini index, 6 which rose from 0.397 in 1967 to
4 See Juan Jose Ganuza and Fernando G6mez, Realistic Standards: Optimal Negli-
gence with Limited Liability, 37 J Legal Stud 577 (2008); Avraham Tabbach, Wealth
Redistribution and the Social Costs of Crime and Law Enforcement (Nov 2008), online at
http//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1309029 (visited May 8, 2010).
5 See, for example, Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful for
Growth?, 84 Am Econ Rev 600 (1994); William Easterly, Inequality Does Cause Underde-
velopment: Insights from a New Instrument, 84 J Dev Econ 755 (2007). Other evidence
finds the opposite results. See, for example, Kristin Forbes, A Reassessment of the Rela-
tionship Between Inequality and Growth, 90 Am Econ Rev 869 (2000).
6 The Gini index or coefficient measures the deviation between a perfectly equal
distribution of income (or, alternatively, wealth) and the actual distribution. Graphically,
if a horizontal axis represents the percentage of the population and the vertical axis rep-
resents the percentage of society's income, then one can represent perfect equality with a
diagonal line from (0, 0) to (100, 100). Each additional percentage point of the population
holds exactly one more percent of the income. In an unequal society, a Lorenz curve rep-
resents the income of each individual in society, starting with the poorest. The curve
starts at the beginning of the diagonal (because 0 percent of the population must hold 0
percent of income), but falls below it because the poorest X percent of individuals have
less than X percent of society's income. The Gini coefficient and Gini index are measures
of the size of the difference in the diagonal and the Lorenz curve for a society. See Kuan
Xu, How Has the Literature on Gini's Index Evolved in the Past 80 Years?, Dalhousie U
Dept of Economics Working Paper 1, 4, 6-8 (Jan 2004), online at http;//economics.dal.ca/
RePEc/dal/wparcb/howgini.pdf (visited May 8, 2010).
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0.466 in 2008, an increase of 17 percent. 7 A more commonly cited
statistic-because the change is so dramatic-concerns the in-
come of top earners. In 2007, the income share of the top 10 per-
cent of households reached almost 50 percent, which is the high-
est ever (given records back to 1913). The top 1 percent of income
earners reached 23.5 percent of the total income share, which is
the second highest year ever after 1928; and the top 1 percent of
1 percent (.01 percent) reached a 6 percent share, which is the
highest ever.8 But the rising inequality is not entirely limited to
the elite. In 1967, the households at the eightieth percentile of
income had incomes 1.66 times the income of households at the
fiftieth percentile; in 2008, the ratio had risen to 1.99.9 Similarly,
in 1967, the income of households at the 80th percentile was 3.95
times the income of households at the 20th percentile, but that
ratio increased to 4.84 by 2008.10
The recession provides an important moment to reassess the
theoretical and empirical connection between inequality and
crime. One reason is that recessions can affect inequality, though
it turns out to be highly variable: sometimes they diminish ine-
quality, sometimes they increase it, and sometimes they have no
effect. 1 More importantly, the recession may offer an occasion
7 See US Census Bureau, Selected Measures of Household Income Dispersion: 1967
to 2008 (on file with U Chi Legal F). These numbers are pre-tax. We can instead measure
the Gini index after taxes and government transfers, when there is less inequality. The
post-tax/transfer Gini index has risen from .32 in the mid- 1970s to .38 in the mid-2000s, a
rise of 19%. See http/stats. oecd.org/Index.aspx?&QueryId=ll353&QueryType=View
(visited May 8, 2010).
8 See Emmanuel Saez, Striking It Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the Unit-
ed States, 1 & Figures 1-3 (Aug 5, 2009), online at http//elsa.berkeley. edU/-saer/saez-
UStopincomes-2007.pdf (visited May 8, 2010). Saez's paper updates the data reported in
Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998,
118 Q J Econ 1 (2003). Necessarily, the share for all other groups shrunk over the time
period. See, for example, Selected Measures of Household Income Dispersion (cited in note
7) (reporting that the share of income earned by the third-middle-quintile declined from
17.3 percent of total income in 1967 to 14.7 percent of total income in 2008).
9 That change constitutes a 20 percent increase in the ratio. See Selected Measures
of Household Income Dispersion (cited in note 7).
10 Id. That change constitutes a 22.5 percent increase in the ratio. Id. Economic liter-
ature debates the causes of this long-term trend. See, for example, Ian Dew-Becker and
Robert J. Gordon, Controversies about the Rise in American Inequality: A Survey, Nation-
al Bureau of Economics Research Working Paper 13982 (2008), online at
httpV/papers.nber.org/papers/w13982.pdf (visited Oct 4, 2010). But one interesting fact is
how the United States diverges from other nations. The United States was very similar to
the income distribution in the United Kingdom and France for much of the twentieth
century, but since around 1980, the United States has deviated from the other two by the
rapid increase in the income share of top earners. See Piketty and Saez, 118 Q J Econ at
35-37 (cited in note 8).
1 See, for example, George Psacharopoulos, et al, Poverty and Income Inequality in
Latin America During the 1980s, 41 Rev Income & Wealth 245, 253 (1995) (examining
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for policy change to ameliorate inequality. The recession, the
Democratic administration, and the new salience of elite execu-
tive compensation all make it possible-or more possible than it
has been or apparently will be for some time-that the federal
government will increase the progressivity of its income tax or
take other measures to address income inequality. This Article
will address one relevant point in that debate-the link between
inequality and crime.
One might expect me to focus on the link between the
recession's unemployment and crime. 12 While that variable is a
worthy topic, I think inequality is more important. There are no
advocates for unemployment as a general policy, as it does not
have benefits to offset its obvious costs. By contrast, because
there are benefits to meritocratic inequality, there are those who
view it positively and oppose policies of redistribution. Thus, it is
quite important to understand fully the economic costs as well as
the benefits of this increasingly powerful dynamic of our
economy. To this end, I explore the theory and evidence of two
links: that material inequality causes increases in (1) street
crimes of property acquisition and (2) crimes constituted by gov-
ernmental corruption.
fourteen recessions in Latin America and finding inequality rose with recessions and fell
with recoveries); Gladys Lopez-Acevedo and Angel Salinas, How Mexico's Financial Crisis
Affected Income Distribution, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 2406
(2000), online at http/www-wds.worldbank.orgexternal/defaul/WDSContentServer/
IW3P/IB/2000/08f26/000094946_00081705310276/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf (visited
Oct 4, 2010) (discussing why Mexico's financial crisis reduced income inequality); Tito
Boeri and Andrea Brandolini, The Age of Discontent: Italian Households at the Beginning
of the Decade, Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No 1530, 13 (2005),
online at http/ftp.iza.org/dpl530.pdf (visited Oct 4, 2010) (rising inequality stabilized
after major recession in 1993).
12 There is a substantial literature on the effect of short-term and long-term unem-
ployment on crime, tending to find that unemployment increases crime. See, for example,
Steven Raphael and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on
Crime, 44 J L & Econ 259, 276 (2001) (concluding that higher unemployment unambigu-
ously increases property crime rates); Anna Oster and Jonas Agell, Crime and Unem-
ployment in Turbulent Times, 5 J Eur Econ Assn 752, 754 (2007) (finding that there is a
clear relationship between unemployment and the incidence of burglary, auto theft, and
drug possession); Karin Edmark, Unemployment and Crime: Is There a Connection?, 107
Scand J Econ 353 (2005) (finding fairly robust evidence of a positive link between unem-
ployment and property crime in the form of burglary and car theft in Swedish countries
during the period 1988-1999); Eric D. Gould, Bruce A. Weinberg, and David B. Mustard,
Crime Rates and Local Labor Market Opportunities in the United States: 1979-1997, 84
Rev Econ & Stat 45, 46 (2002) (finding that young, unskilled men are responsive to the
opportunity costs of crime).
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I. MATERIAL INEQUALITY INCREASES STREET CRIME:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE
The standard economic prediction is that material inequality
increases crime. The economic theory of crime views the decision
to offend as a rational response to the costs and benefits of vari-
ous alternative actions. 13 The decision to steal, for example, in-
volves a choice between two different ways of generating income:
one can invest time in lawful production or in appropriating the
property of others. The model predicts that an individual will
steal when his expected returns from illegal work exceed that of
legal work. 14 Of course, sometimes one can both work lawfully
and steal when the opportunity arises. But because businesses
and some individuals act to protect their property from theft, as
with locks, alarms, security cameras, safes, etc., much casual
theft is prevented. In these cases, professional theft may succeed
because one has invested the time to learn how to bypass securi-
ty measures and the facts needed for a particular heist. To some
extent, one chooses between the occupation of thievery and a
lawful occupation.
If so, then as Isaac Ehrlich noted decades ago, those with
"legitimate returns" that are "well below the median have great-
er differential returns from property crimes and, hence, a greater
incentive to participate in such crimes, relative to those with in-
come well above the median."15 As Edward Glaeser put it: "[A]s
inequality rises, the returns to crime increase for the poor (be-
cause rich victims [are] richer) and the opportunity costs of crime
are lower (because the poor are poorer)." 16 Conversely, with sig-
nificant equality, those at the bottom are more likely to prefer
their lawful means of generating income to stealing from those
with only slightly more wealth. The theory thus predicts a posi-
13 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J Pol Econ
169, 170-74 (1968).
14 To be more precise, if one's expected returns are net of all costs, including non-
monetary costs like guilt and shame, then one will offend if one's expected returns from
offending exceed one's expected returns from not offending.
15 See Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities: An Economic Analysis, in
Gary S. Becker and William M. Landes, eds, Essays in the Economics of Crime and Pun-
ishment 68, 87 (National Bureau of Economic Research 1974).
16 See Edward L. Glaeser, Inequality, Harvard Institute of Economic Research Dis-
cussion Paper No 2078, 10 (July 2005), online at http/www.economics.harvard.edu/
pu/hier/2005/HIER2078.pdf (visited Oct 4, 2010). See also Richard A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 508 (5th ed Aspen Law and Business 1998) ("The forgone income of a
legitimate alternative occupation is low for someone who has little earning capacity in
legitimate occupations, while the proximity of wealth increases the expected return from
crime.").
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tive relationship between inequality and property crimes, such
as car theft, burglary, and fraud. The theory implies a similar
positive relationship for any crime motivated in part by the ac-
quisition of material value. Thus, robbery and black market
crimes such as drug trafficking should rise with inequality, as
should financially-motivated murder, for example, in violent
clashes with rival drug suppliers.
Consider two objections to this theory. First, one might rea-
sonably claim that people do not constantly recalculate whether
or not to steal. Individuals whose self-identity includes being
honest and excludes the occupation of being a thief or a drug-
dealer will not recalculate the gains from crime when their law-
ful opportunities decline slightly. Second, one might object to the
implication that the poorest will steal from the wealthiest, as
much observed crime is intra-class. The poor, for example, mostly
steal from other poor in the same neighborhood.
Neither point robs the theory of its power. The first point-
essentially the stickiness of consumptive and productive deci-
sions-is fully consistent with the prediction that inequality af-
fects those near the margin of choice between crime and no
crime. Some individuals are infra-marginal, having such strong
reason to choose lawful or unlawful means of generating income
that they will not recalculate their decision with any frequency,
given the decision costs. Even with bounded rationality and a
preference to conform to one's self-identity, however, there will
be individuals who find themselves on the margin, perhaps when
they are young and have yet to form a strong identity as a law-
abider or law-violator, when they face a dramatic contraction in
their lawful opportunities, or when they encounter an unusually
attractive opportunity to offend. The theory predicts that in
these marginal cases, the greater the inequality, the more attrac-
tive the crime, other things constant.
To some extent, the second objection-that much crime is in-
tra-class-is subject to the same retort. Some crime is inter-class;
if inequality increases the returns to committing crimes against
a higher class, it will increase inter-class crime and hence overall
crime. Yet the second objection does suggest that we should com-
plicate the analysis by taking account of the precautionary
measures of potential crime victims. Although the poorest indi-
viduals have the most to gain by successfully stealing from the
richest, there are reasons that the poorest might find it much
harder to succeed in stealing from the richest than in stealing
from, say, the middle class. Wealthier individuals will invest
more in private security measures against crime-fences, dogs,
[2010:
ECONOMIC COSTS OF INEQUALITY
alarms, guards, etc.-both because they have more wealth to
protect and more wealth to spend on protection. Most obviously,
the wealthy tend to live together in wealthy, sometimes-gated
communities, making the poor who come into the neighborhood
very visible. Indeed, the poorest individuals may find it too com-
plicated or risky to travel to a neighborhood far away from their
own for purposes of offending and therefore concentrate on the
wealthiest people in their own or immediately bordering neigh-
borhoods.
Initially, even if this objection meant that inequality does
not increase crime, it would still point to another cost of inequali-
ty: an increase in costs of crime prevention. Because the increase
in inequality increases the returns from successful crime, the
rich invest more in preventing crimes from being successful.
Even if the net result were no more crime, there would still be
more dead weight losses from investments in crime prevention.
Installing bars on the windows might prevent burglary, but the
homeowner loses the costs of the bars (including aesthetic and
fire safety losses), while the frustrated burglar gains nothing.
Similarly, not buying expensive art or stereo equipment may
successfully prevent the burglary of those objects, but the home-
owner loses the value of enjoying those goods, while the potential
burglar again gains nothing. 17
Yet, to return to the main point, the ability of the rich to in-
vest in crime prevention does not void the basic theoretical claim
that inequality increases inter-class crime. First, because eco-
nomic segregation is imperfect, increasing inequality will tend to
increase inequality within neighborhoods and especially between
bordering neighborhoods. As the economic gap between the rich-
est and poorest individuals within a geographic area increases,
the returns from crime increase. Second, assume it takes a cer-
tain amount of wealth and human capital to be the kind of bur-
glar or scam artist who can successfully prey on the richest indi-
viduals or sell them black market goods. Assume the necessary
investments put these crimes out of reach of the poorest seg-
ments. Nonetheless, for moderate-wealthy individuals who can
afford to make these investments, their returns to crime will in-
crease as the gap between themselves and the richest individuals
17 Of course, the person selling window security bars gains from selling them. But the
seller, in the long run, could gain from selling something else-for example, window cur-
tains-that did not produce dead weight losses. In any event, the second example is
clearer because the seller of art or stereo equipment also loses from the potential buyer's
fear of crime.
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increases. Recall, for example, the Census data recounted above
showing an increase in the ratio between the income of house-
holds in the eightieth and fiftieth percentiles.18
In addition to Ehrlich's initial theory, there are at least two
more economic reasons one might expect inequality to increase
crime. First, inequality may dilute the deterrent effect of crimi-
nal sanctions.1 9 The dominant punishment in many wealthy na-
tions, at least for serious crimes, is prison, yet the deterrent ef-
fect of prison depends on the perceived difference between life in
prison and life out of prison. In a wealthy nation, prison may
work well as a deterrent of the citizen of average wealth because
the perceived difference is so great. But in a nation with substan-
tial inequality that forgoes torture and inhumane treatment of
prisoners, the poorest citizen may live almost as badly outside of
prison as he would inside prison, or at least the gap, and hence
the deterrent, is much smaller. In economic terms, the costs of
prison are lower for the poor. Inequality therefore negatively af-
fects the deterrent efficiency of prison; more inequality means
there are more people for whom prison threatens a lower cost. 20
Of course, inequality creates a class of wealthier citizens who are
especially deterred by the threat of prison, but because the rela-
tively poor have the greatest incentive to offend (for the reasons
Ehrlich gave), the loss of deterrence for them outweighs the gain
in deterrence of the rich.21
Another possibility is that inequality adversely affects the
level of policing. According to economic theory and empiricism,
more policing raises the probability of detecting crime and there-
fore decrease crime. 22 But the provision of a public good like po-
licing requires collective political action that is most likely when
the actors are homogeneous in their demand for the good. When
18 See Selected Measures of Household Income Dispersion (cited in note 7).
19 Earling Eide, Economics of Criminal Behavior, in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit
De Geest, eds, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Vol V The Economics of Crime and
Litigation 345, 361 (Edward Elgar 2000).
20 The point may be made more general by including the analysis of fines. Others
have observed that the effectiveness of criminal fines, like tort damages, depends on the
level of inequality, with increased inequality diluting the effectiveness of fines, as more
people become judgment proof. See Ganuza and G6mez, 37 J Legal Stud at 581 (cited in
note 4); Tabbach, Wealth Redistribution at 13-17 (cited in note 4).
21 Nonetheless, the next Part argues that inequality makes the rich more likely to
commit crimes of bribery. If so, then the increased deterrent effect of prison noted in the
text may push back against the tendency to commit crimes of political corruption.
22 See, for example, Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s:
Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J Econ Persp 163, 171
(2004); Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles In Police Hiring To Estimate The Effects
Of Police On Crime: Reply, 92 Am Econ Rev 1244, 1245-49 (2002).
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citizens are instead heterogeneous, differing in the type and
quantity of public goods they value, the cost of their political or-
ganization is higher and the government will provide less of such
goods. Thus, it will be easier to organize political support for pay-
ing taxes to fund police if everyone agrees on the priorities the
police should have. But, as Glaeser explains, income inequality
makes this less likely:
[T]he rich might want a legal system focused on protect-
ing property while the poor might be more concerned with
preventing interpersonal violence in disadvantaged areas.
Because these groups disagree, there is less willingness to
invest in a common legal system than there would be if
the population shared a common set of legal needs. 23
Of course, the rich and poor may segregate themselves into sepa-
rate political communities, each of which is homogeneous. But
there are economies of scale to policing and other municipal ser-
vices, which is why modern societies have many large cities with
the rich and poor sharing a common police force. Thus, other
things equal, rising inequality within a city should decrease po-
lice funding. As an anecdotal illustration, Glaeser notes that
New York City has 28,000 police officers, while Bogota, Colum-
bia, with a similar population but far more inequality, has only
12,000 officers. 24
23 Glaeser, Inequality at 11 (cited in note 16).
24 Id at 10. A final reason for the inequality-crime link is the possibility of relative
preferences. See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 Yale L J 1, 3 (1992)
(explaining how individuals seek relative status and income and exploring the relevance
of this competition for law); Francisco Alpizar, Fredrik Carlsson, and Olof Johansson-
Stenman, How Much Do We Care about Absolute Versus Relative Income and Consump-
tion?, J Econ Behav & Org 405, 411-14 (2005) (demonstrating that most individuals are
concerned with both relative income and relative consumption of particular goods); Olof
Johansson-Stenman, Fredrik Carlsson and Dinky Daruvala, Measuring Future Grand-
parents' Preferences for Equality and Relative Standing, 112 Econ J 362, 364-78 (2005)
(arguing that an individual's personal utility partially depends on relative income). Indi-
viduals may care intrinsically about how their income or consumption compares to others.
But the exact nature of the preference determines whether the link between inequality
and crime is positive or negative. For example, suppose individuals desire the higher
ranks. In a society with very little inequality, a single successful theft might improve
one's relative rank very substantially, where the same theft in a very unequal society
would change one's rank very little. Thus, inequality decreases the incentive for theft. By
contrast, suppose individuals desire to avoid falling too far behind the mean. Adam
Smith, for example, defined poverty as falling so far below the standard of living as to
incur shame. See McAdams, 102 Yale L J at 11-12, citing Adam Smith, The Theory of
Moral Sentiments 112-13, David D. Rafael and Alexander L. Macfie, eds (Clarendon
Press 1976). If so, then everyone can satisfy this preference in a society with very low
inequality, but greater levels of inequality create new incentives to acquire property,
which includes acquiring property by theft.
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To my knowledge, no one has tested Glaeser's claim.25 The
studies tend to control for the level of policing rather than meas-
uring an effect of inequality on police. The theory is suggestive,
however, given Steven Levitt's finding that the United States
underinvests in police compared to prisons. 26 The crime-reducing
returns to investing an extra dollar in public policing significant-
ly exceed the crime-reducing returns to investing an extra dollar
in prisons. Perhaps the explanation is that the wealthy can em-
ploy their own private police but cannot run their own private
prison system; they therefore prefer public money go to prisons
while spending privately on security. 27
In any event, the empirical evidence generally supports the
claim of the first two theories that inequality increases crime. In
an early economic study, Erhlich examined crime levels among
the states in 1940, 1950, and 1960 and found that "[c]rimes
against property (robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft) ...
vary positively with the percentage of families below one-half of
the median income."28 After Ehrlich's 1973 study, sociologists
and economists explored the issue using different data and dif-
ferent statistical methods. Hsieh and Pugh conducted a meta-
analysis of the literature in 1993 and found a significant link
between income inequality and violent crime.29 In 2004, Rodrigo
25 There is evidence of a different but parallel point. A recent paper finds that, inde-
pendent of absolute poverty, income inequality is associated with higher infant mortality.
See Tilman Tacke and Robert J. Waldmann, Income Distribution, Infant Mortality, and
Health Care Expenditure, Centre for Economics and International Studies Tor Vergata
Research Paper Series, Vol 7, Issue 3, No 146 (2009), online at http;/papers.ssrn.com/
sol/papers.cfm?abstract id=1434514 (visited Oct 4, 2010). The authors explain the find-
ing by the fact that, holding social wealth constant, public expenditures on health care
fall as inequality rises. The reason could be that the inequalities create heterogeneity in
the demand for health care and insurance, which lowers the willingness to spend tax
dollars to provide these goods.
26 See Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors
that Explain the Decline and Seven that Do Not, 18 J Econ Persp 163, 176-79 (2004)
(concluding that "a dollar spent on prisons yields an estimated crime reduction that is 20
percent less than a dollar spent on police.").
27 See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L Rev 1165, 1171-82 (1999).
Or the rich may use their political power to divert public police to their own neighbor-
hoods and refuse to fund additional police who would be effective at reducing crime in
poor neighborhoods.
28 Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activities at 94 (cited in note 15). See also
Belton M. Fleisher, The Effect of Income on Delinquency, 56 Am Econ Rev 118 (1966)
(studying whether low income is a cause of juvenile delinquency).
29 Ching-Chi Hsieh and M.D. Pugh, Poverty, Income Inequality, and Violent Crime: A
Meta-Analysis of Recent Aggregate Data Studies, 18 Crim Just Rev 182, 198 (1993) (ap-
plying meta-analysis to thirty-four aggregate data studies reporting seventy-six zero-
order correlation coefficients for all measures of violent crime with either poverty or in-
come inequality, of which all but two, or 97 percent, were positive and, of those, nearly 80
percent were of at least moderate strength, meaning greater than 0.25).
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Reis Soares reviewed and summarized the literature, finding it
more mixed.30 Many studies found a positive relationship be-
tween inequality and crime, many found no significant relation-
ship, and virtually no study found a negative relationship. 31
In more recent years, the issue has attracted increasing at-
tention, and the newer wave of studies tends to confirm that ine-
quality causes crime. Some of these studies introduce interesting
methodological refinements. Soares, for example, noted that pri-
or studies relied overwhelmingly on reported crime, even though
30 See Rodrigo Reis Soares, Development, Crime, and Punishment: Accounting for the
International Differences in Crime Rates, 73 J Dev Econ 155 (2004).
31 See id at Table 1, which categorizes the following fourteen studies: Ralph C. Allen,
Socioeconomic Conditions and Property Crime: A Comprehensive Review and Test of the
Professional Literature, 55 Am J Econ & Soc 293, 300-03 (1996) (using a time series of
United States national data and finding no significant effect of inequality on crime);
William C. Bailey, Poverty, Inequality, and City Homicide Rates, 22 Criminol 531, 535-43
(1984) (using a cross-section analysis of United States city data and finding no significant
effect on murder); Peter M. Blau and Judith R. Blau, The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan
Structure and Violent Crime, 47 Am Soc Rev 114, 120-26 (1982) (using cross-section
analysis of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) and finding a positive effect
on murder and assault and no significant effect on rape or robbery); Leo Carroll and
Pamela Irving Jackson, Inequality, Opportunity, and Crime Rates in Central Cities, 21
Criminol 178, 181-91 (1983) (using cross-section analysis of United States cities data and
finding a positive effect of inequality on burglary, robbery, and crime against the person);
Sheldon Danzinger and David Wheeler, The Economics of Crime: Punishment or Income
Redistribution, 33 Rev Soc Econ 113, 120-26 (1975) (using United States national data
for time series and ftiding a positive effect on robbery and no significant effect on burgla-
ry or assault; using cross-section analysis of SMSA and finding a positive effect on bur-
glary, assault, and robbery); Paul Eberts and Kent Schwirian, Metropolitan Crime Rates
and Relative Deprivation, 5 Criminologica 43, 48-51 (1968) (using cross-section analysis
of SMSA data and finding positive effect on total crime); Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Leder-
man, and Norman Loayza, Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World:
An Empirical Assessment at 18-29 (World Bank Latin America and Caribbean Studies
1998) (using cross-country panel data and finding a positive effect on homicide and rob-
bery); Richard Fowles and Mary Merva, Wage Inequality and Criminal Activity: An Ex-
treme Bounds Analysis for the United States, 1975-90, 34 Criminol 163, 166-78 (1996)
(using panel date for SMSA and finding a positive effect on aggravated assault, murder,
and larceny; no significant effect on car theft, robbery, or burglary; and a negative effect
on rape); David Jacobs, Inequality and Economic Crime, 66 Sociol & Soc Res 12, 12-22
(1981) (using cross-section analysis of SMSA data and finding a positive relationship on
burglary, grand larceny, and robbery); Morgan Kelly, Inequality and Crime, 82 Rev Econ
& Stat 530, 531-33 (2000) (using cross-section analysis of United States county data and
finding a strong and robust effect on violent crime, but no significant effect on property
crime); Steven F. Messner, Poverty, Inequality, and the Urban Homicide Rate, 20 Crimi-
nol 103, 106-11 (1982) (using a cross-section analysis of SMSA data and finding no signif-
icant effect on murder); E. Britt Patterson, Poverty, Income Inequality, and Community
Crime Rates, 29 Criminol 755, 764-69 (1991) (using cross-section analysis on United
States neighborhood data and finding no significant effect on burglary or violent crime);
Steven Stack, Income Inequality and Property Crime: A Cross-National Analysis of Rela-
tive Deprivation Theory, 22 Criminol 229, 237-48 (1984) (using cross-section analysis
across nations and finding a negative effect on property crime); Kirk R. Williams, Eco-
nomic Sources of Homicide: Reestimating the Effects of Poverty and Inequality, 49 Am Soc
Rev 283, 285-88 (1984) (using a cross-section analysis of SMSA data and finding no sig-
nificant effect on homicide).
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there is significant underreporting of crime. Soares found that
underreporting systematically distorted the analysis of the link
between inequality and crime and therefore examined the con-
nection in two new ways: first, using victimization surveys and,
second, using a statistical adjustment to reported crime. In the
two cross-section analyses of international data, he found a sig-
nificant and positive relationship: inequality increases thefts,
burglaries, and contact crimes such as robbery and assault. The
effect is robust across specifications and quite large: one specifi-
cation implies "that reducing inequality from the level of a coun-
try like Colombia to levels comparable to Argentina, Australia, or
United Kingdom, would reduce thefts by 50%, and contact crimes
by 85%."32 Matz Dahlbert and Magnus Gustavsson offered a dif-
ferent innovation: separating the effects of transitory changes in
income from permanent changes. Using Swedish panel data from
1974 to 2000, they found that, while an increase in inequality of
transitory income had no effect on crime, an increase in the ine-
quality of permanent income significantly increased total crime. 33
Other studies seek to separate the effects of inequality on
the poorest from the more general effect. Frangois Bourguignon,
Jairo Nufiez, and Fabio Sanchez34 used panel data from seven
Colombian cities over twenty years to isolate the effect inequality
has on a particular group-those living in households where per
capita income was below 80 percent of the mean. Though varia-
tions in inequality affecting those above this group did not affect
crime rates, variations in inequality affecting this group did to a
significant degree. 35 Similarly, Anna Nilsson used individual-
level panel data to examine the effect of income inequality on
crime in Sweden from 1973 to 2000.36 She found a significant
positive effect between the proportion of the population with in-
come below 10 percent of the median and the incidence of proper-
ty crime. Specifically, a "one-percentage point increase in the
proportion of the population with an income below 10 percent of
the median income would increase ... the burglary rate [by] 5.9
32 Soares, 73 J Dev Econ at 178 (cited in note 30).
33 See Matz Dahlberg and Magnus Gustavsson, Inequality and Crime: Separating the
Effects of Permanent and Transitory Income, 70 Oxford Bull Econ & Stat 129, 141-48
(2008).
34 Franoqois Bourguignon, Jairo Nufiez, and Fabio Sanchez, A Structural Model of
Crime and Inequality in Colombia, 1 J Eur Econ Assoc 440 (2003).
31 Id at 445-48.
36 Anna Nilsson, Income Inequality and Crime: The Case of Sweden, Institute for
Labour Market Policy Evaluation Working Paper No 2004:6 (May 4, 2004), online at
http/www.ifau.se/upload/pdf/se/2004/wpO4-06.pdf (visited Oct 4, 2010).
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percent, the number of auto thefts [by] 22.1 and the robbery rate
[by] 9.1 percent, everything else held constant. "37
Perhaps the most econometrically sophisticated study is the
one Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza
published in the Journal of Law and Economics in 2002.38 They
reported on panel data consisting of five-year averages for homi-
cides in thirty-nine countries during 1965-95 and for robberies in
thirty-seven countries during 1970-94. 39 Across and within coun-
tries, they studied the correlation between inequality as defined
by various measures and crime, measured by robbery and homi-
cide, while controlling for other influences on the crime rate and
various forms of measurement error. They concluded that
"[c]rime rates and inequality are positively correlated (within
each country and, particularly, between countries), and it ap-
pears that this correlation reflects causation from inequality to
crime rates, even controlling for other crime determinants."40
Specifically, they found that if the Gini index "falls permanently
by the within-country standard deviation in the sample (about
2.4 percentage points), the intentional homicide rate will de-
crease by 3.7 percent in the short run and 20 percent in the long
run."41 They also found that "a decline of 1 within-country stand-
ard deviation in the Gini coefficient (about 2.1 percent) leads to a
37 Id at 30. For similar results involving Canada and South Africa, see Martin Daly,
Margo Wilson, and Shawn Vasdev, Income Inequality and Homicide Rates in Canada and
the United States, 43 Canadian J Criminol 219, 224-31 (2001) (finding that provincial
and municipal income inequality and homicide rates move in the same direction even
though greater inequality occurs in wealthier areas); Gabriel Demombynes and Berk
Ozler, Crime and Local Inequality in South Africa, in Haroon Bhorat and Ravi Kanbur,
eds, Poverty and Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa 288-320 (Human Sciences Re-
search Council Press 2006) (controlling for police expenditures, unemployment, and ine-
quality within a given police precinct, burglary rates, but not other crimes, are 20 percent
higher in jurisdictions that are the wealthiest among their neighbors).
38 See Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza, Inequality and Vio-
lent Crime, 45 J Law & Econ 1 (2002).
39 A related but smaller literature links crime to wages by showing that declining
wages for the least skilled workers increases crime. See Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard,
84 Rev Econ & Stat at 49-57 (cited in note 12); Jeff Grogger, Market Wages and Youth
Crime, 16 J Labor Econ 756, 768-87 (1998); Richard B. Freeman, Why Do So Many Young
American Men Commit Crimes and What Might We Do about It?, 10 J Econ Persp 25, 30-
33 (1996).
40 See Fajinzylber, Lederman, and Loayza, 45 J Law & Econ at 26 (cited in note 38).
This result is robust to changes in the crime rate when it is used as the dependent varia-
ble (whether homicide or robbery), the sample of countries and periods, alternative
measures of income inequality, the set of additional variables explaining crime rates
(control variables), and the method of econometric estimation. Id at 25.
41 Id at 17. The standard deviation is a statistical measure of variability or spread of
a variable. It is equal to the square root of the variance, which is the average distance
between the set of variables and their mean.
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6.5 percent decline of the robbery rate in the short run and a 23.2
percent decline in the long run."42
The recent studies are not, however, entirely consistent. Eric
Neumayer, for example, criticized the study by Fajnzylber, Le-
derman, and Loayza, claiming that the effects of inequality on
violent crime disappear when a larger sample of countries (fifty-
nine instead of thirty-nine or thirty-seven) is used and there is a
control for country fixed effects. 43 Yet the overall results favor
the inequality-crime link. Several new studies focus specifically
on the regional variation of crime and inequality in the United
States and find a strong positive relationship. 44 To illustrate the
possible magnitude of the effects, consider the findings of Ayse
Imrohoroglu, Antonio Merlo, and Peter Rupert. 45 Their primary
goal was not to explore the relationship between inequality and
crime but to answer a question vexing economists: what explains
the recent drop in crime in the United States? Much of the drop
was in property crime-burglary, larceny, robbery, and motor
vehicle theft-which fell from a rate of 5.6 per one hundred in-
habitants in 1980 to 4.65 in 1996.46 These researchers found
three primary causes of the decline: a greater probability of ap-
prehension, a stronger economy, and the aging of the population
(a relative decline in twenty- to twenty-eight-year-old males).47
In addition, they found a major influence on crime working
against the decline: the "marked increase" in income inequality
during this time period (from a standard deviation of 0.397 to
42 Id at 18. See also Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman and Norman Loayza, Crime
and Victimization: An Economic Perspective, 1 Economica 219, 244-48 (2001).
13 See Eric Neumayer, Inequality and Violent Crime: Evidence from Data on Robbery
and Violent Theft, 42 J Peace Res 101 (2005). See also Jesse Brush, Does Income Inequali-
ty Lead to More Crime? A Comparison of Cross-Sectional and Time-Series Analyses of
United States Counties, 96 Econ Letters 264, 265 (2007) (criticizing studies that control
for too few variables); George Saridakis, Violent Crime in the United States of America: A
Time-Series Analysis Between 1960-2000, 18 Eur J Law & Econ 203, 208-16 (2004) (find-
ing no long term effect of any economic variables on violent crime and a short-run effect of
inequality only on murder, though that effect is substantial).
44 See Edward L. Glaeser, Matthew G. Resseger, and Kristina Tobio, Urban Inequali-
ty, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 14419 (2008), online at
http;//www.nber.org/papers/wl4419.pdf (visited Oct 4, 2010) (finding a strong positive
relationship between inequality in American municipalities and the municipal murder
rate, with various controls); Choe Jongmook, Income Inequality and Crime in the United
States, 101 Econ Letters 31 (2008) (examining variation in inequality and crime among
American states, controlling for fixed effects, and finding a strong effect of inequality on
burglary and robbery).
45 Ayse Imrohoroglu, Antonio Merlo, and Peter Rupert, What Accounts for the Decline
in Crime?, 45 Intl Econ Rev 707 (2004).
46 Id at 707.
47 Id at 709.
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0.476).48 Thus, the crime drop would have been much larger had
there not been this rise in inequality. Specifically, "[b]y holding
inequality constant at its 1980 level we could have observed a 55
percent drop in property crime [by 1996] as opposed to a 17 per-
cent drop."49
In sum, though the empirical connection between inequality
and crime is not fully resolved and requires more study, there is
significant evidence that it is real and substantial. 50 An economic
cost of inequality is greater street crime.
II. MATERIAL INEQUALITY INCREASES CORRUION:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE
In a democratic society, economic theory predicts that mate-
rial inequality will increase crimes of corruption. One reason
runs parallel to the above discussion of street crime, but the ef-
fect works on the rich rather than the poor. If everyone had the
same material wealth, it would be difficult for any one person to
"buy" government officials or agencies. By contrast, inequality
facilitates bribery.
The point is most easily understood by focusing on two indi-
viduals. Suppose A and B each wish to influence a court case,
municipal legislation, or a zoning board decision in inconsistent
ways. Each considers offering a bribe to C, the relevant judge,
legislator, or zoning board member. Relative income matters in
two ways. First, focus on the relative incomes of the potential
briber and bribee. The maximum size of the bribe an individual
is willing to offer depends on, among other things, the individu-
al's income. If A and B have the same income as C, then the max-
imum bribe either will offer will be lower and less tempting than
if either A or B has much greater wealth than C. Being less
tempting, a given risk of criminal sanctions is more likely to
deter the offer from being accepted and therefore more likely to
deter the offer from ever being made. Second, consider the rela-
tive incomes of the two potential bribers. If A and B have the
48 Id at 717-18.
49 Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert, 45 Intl Econ Rev at 724 (cited in note 45). See
also Francois Bourguignon, Crime as a Social Cost of Poverty and Inequality: A Review
Focusing on Developing Countries, in Shahid Yusuf, Simon Evenett, and Weiping Wu,
eds, Facets of Globalization 171-91 (World Bank 2001).
50 See Gary LaFree, A Summary and Review of Cross-National Comparative Studies
of Homicide, in M. Dwayne Smith and Margaret A. Zahn, eds, Homicide: A Sourcebook of
Social Research 125-45 (Sage Publications 1999) (reporting that a positive link between
inequality and homicide is one of the most robust findings of cross-national crime re-
search).
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same income as each other, then it is possible neither can offer a
bribe so large that the other cannot match it. There is a greater
chance, therefore, that they will fear that their bribe will prove
ineffective or that they can just as productively seek to settle the
dispute with the other party.
By contrast, inequality increases the productivity of bribery.
First, inequality makes it more likely that one of the private citi-
zens, A or B, has sufficient resources, relative to C, to make a
bribe tempting to C. Second, if A and B have highly unequal
wealth, then the wealthier can bribe C without having to worry
that the other can nullify the effect of the bribe by matching it.
That wealthier individual may find it cheaper to bribe the gov-
ernment official than to settle the dispute with the other citizen.
The economists Edward Glaeser, Jose Scheinkman, and An-
drei Shleifer made this point regarding the judiciary: "If one per-
son is sufficiently richer than another, and courts are corrupti-
ble, then the legal system will favor the rich, not the just."51
Thus, where inequality causes the poor to commit more property-
related crime, inequality causes the rich to commit more crimes
of corruption because, the relatively richer they are, the more
productive their bribes are likely to be. Political influence should
operate as a "luxury" good in that we expect an individual to use
a greater percentage of his income on such a good the more
wealth he has relative to others in society.52
Much economic theory focuses on a different reason to expect
inequality to increase corruption. Inequality creates a divisive
political issue-redistribution. Within a given democracy, the
51 See Edward Glaeser, Jose Scheinkman, and Andrei Shleifer, The Injustice of Ine-
quality, 50 J Monetary Econ 199, 200 (2003).
52 The story becomes more complex when we consider more than two individuals and
apply interest group theory, but the essential point remains: it is harder for citizens to
influence political actors with money when everyone has the same amount of money than
it is when there are some citizens who have a lot more than others. In general, an interest
group's influence depends on a variety of factors, but one is the amount of resources its
members are willing to bring to influence official action. One might think that the larger
the interest group, the more influence it would have, but the offsetting effect is organiza-
tional costs which rise with the number of members. Mancur Olsen, The Logic of Collec-
tive Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard 1965), sparked a large liter-
ature exploring how small groups have an advantage in organizing to use government
power to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of society. See, for example, Daniel
A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction (1991);
Saul Levmore, Public Choice Defended, book review of Gerry Mackie, Democracy Defend-
ed, 72 U Chi L Rev 777 (2005). Wealth exacerbates this problem because now a small
group is not only easier to organize, but also may have greater resources than the much
larger majority group it opposes. Even where groups of equal size care equally about some
issue (as with individuals A and B), inequality means that the relative wealth of some
groups gives them an incentive to use their wealth to influence officials.
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greater the inequality, the greater the expected demand for re-
distribution. The median voter would gain by redistribution, at
least in the common situation where the median income falls be-
low the mean income (because wealth is skewed toward the up-
ward levels since it is bounded by zero at the lower level). So ine-
quality creates a reason for the rich to defeat the political prefer-
ences of the majority for redistribution. "As income inequality
increases, the rich have more to lose through fair political, ad-
ministrative, and judicial processes ... [and] will also have
greater resources that can be used to buy influence, both legally
and illegally."53 Being a minority, the rich cannot rely on voting
power to prevent redistribution; they must use their superior
wealth to influence the political process.
As a normative matter, libertarians might defend this non-
majoritarian outcome as being fair or efficient, at least if the rich
earn their wealth meritocratically by superior effort, talent, or
risk-taking. But the problem does not end with non-
redistribution. Where median voter theory predicts the demand
for redistribution from the rich to the poor-what Glaeser,
Scheinkman, and Shleifer call "Robin Hood Redistribution,"- we
often observe the opposite-what they term "King John Redistri-
bution" from the poor to the rich.5 4 Once the rich invest in cor-
rupting the political process, they don't stop at defeating redis-
tribution to the poor. "[T]he haves can redistribute from the
have-nots by subverting legal, political, and regulatory institu-
tions to work in their favor. They can do so through political con-
tributions, bribes, or just deployments of legal and political re-
sources to get their way."55 Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Schleifer
argued that inequality thus leads to the corruption of institu-
tions, particularly the judiciary, a point for which they provide
two compelling examples-the Gilded Age in the United States
and the former Soviet transition economies of the 1990s. 5 6
The empirical literature on inequality and corruption is rela-
tively thin and what exists is conflicting. Two political scientists,
Jong-sung You and Sanjeev Khagram, recently completed a ma-
jor study.57 Using two-stage least squares and instrumental vari-
ables, they examined the relationship between income inequality
53 See Jong-sung You and Sanjeev Khagram, A Comparative Study of Inequality and
Corruption, 70 Am Soc Rev 136, 138 (2005).
54 Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer, 50 J Monetary Econ at 200 (cited in note 51).
55 Id.
56 Id at 211-14.
57 You and Khagram, 70 Am Soc Rev 136 (cited in note 53).
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and corruption in 129 countries. Controlling for economic devel-
opment, trade openness, natural resource abundance, democracy,
federalism, religion, origin of legal system, and ethno-linguistic
fractionalization and using different measures of corruption, they
find a statistically significant, robust, and powerful correlation.
In simpler models without instrumental variables, they find that
a "one standard deviation reduction in income inequality" (which
is a decrease in the Gini measure of 0.11) is associated with be-
tween 0.23 and 0.30 standard deviation reduction in corruption.58
In more complex models, their "best estimate of the causal effect
that inequality has on corruption" is that "a one-standard devia-
tion reduction in inequality causes about a two-thirds standard
deviation improvement in freedom from corruption."59
Providing some indirect confirmation, Glaeser, Scheinkman,
and Shleifer ran a cross-country comparison that controlled for
the strength of each nation's "rule of law" and found that ine-
quality decreased growth only in countries with below mean rule
of law measures, while inequality had no effect in nations with
strong rule of law.60 They took this as evidence of their particular
theory that inequality decreases growth by corrupting institu-
tions; when the institutions are sufficiently strong, inequality
has no effect on growth.
Contrary to these findings is a working paper by James Alt
and David Lassen.61 Studying the variation among American
states, they found a negative relationship between inequality and
federal corruption convictions. 62 One may question the study for
identifying the probability of detection and the amount of corrup-
tion solely through federal prosecutions, thus ignoring any varia-
tion in state or local corruption prosecutions. But the authors did
note that the quality of data for American jurisdictions is far
greater than available for transnational corruption studies, so
the finding is significant. Alt and Lassen explained the result by
the expected employment consequence of getting convicted for
corruption: a public official caught taking a bribe will (perhaps
58 Id at 147.
59 Id at 149. Eric Uslaner finds a more complex link: that inequality undermines
trust and lack of trust causes corruption. See Eric M. Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of
Trust 190-216 (Cambridge 2002).
60 See Glaeser, 50 J Monetary Econ at 214-15 (cited in note 51).
61 See James E. Alt and David Dreyer Lassen, The Political Economy of Inequality
and Corruption: Evidence from US State Governments, Economic Policy Research Unit
Working Paper Series (Aug 2008), online at http/www.econ.ku.dk/eprn-epru/Workings-
Papers/wp-08-02.pdf (visited Oct 4, 2010).
62 Id at 23 ("Higher income inequality apparently deters corruption.").
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after a prison stint) have to seek modest private employment and
the greater the inequality in the state, the relatively worse the
private job will be. 63 Thus, inequality deters corruption.
Though there is little empirical work on the idea that ine-
quality causes corruption, there is a significant amount of work
that corruption causes inequality.64 Indeed, You and Khagram
tested for and find causation in both directions. 65 As a result, if
inequality does cause more corruption, the increase in corruption
will cause more inequality. "As a result, many societies are likely
to be trapped in vicious circles of inequality and corruption. This
mutually reinforcing relationship possibly explains why income
inequality persists within countries over time."66
CONCLUSION
The expectation of meritocratic inequality creates incentives
for productive behavior. Nonetheless, like everything else in eco-
nomics, there is some optimal degree of meritocratic inequality,
given that there are costs as well as benefits. Some of those costs
are intrinsic, as where one uses a social welfare function that
gives weight to equality of welfare. But some of those costs are
instrumental and do not depend on giving any weight to equality
in the social welfare function. Here, I have identified only one of
those costs. Economic theory and considerable empirical evidence
shows that material inequality increases street crime. Economic
theory also predicts that material inequality increases corrup-
tion, though the empirical evidence is mixed. Given this cost, and
other costs not discussed here, it should be obvious that there is
no reason to believe that the market supplies the efficient level of
inequality. The costs described here are externalities because the
extra crimes that inequality causes are external to the transac-
tions that produce them. The current recession provides a plau-
sible time for Americans to consider how much inequality they
believe is desirable given that doing nothing will apparently pro-
duce more and more of it.
63 Id at 10.
64 See, for example, Alberto Chong and Mark Gradstein, Inequality and Institutions,
89 Rev Econ & Stat, 454 (2007); Oguzhan C. Dincer and Burak Gunalp, Corruption, In-
come Inequality, and Poverty in the United States, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working
Paper No 54.2008 (July 11, 2008), online at http/ssrn.com/abstract=1158446 (visited Oct
4, 2010).
65 You and Khagram, 70 Am Soc Rev at 152-53 (cited in note 53).
66 Id at 153.

